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conspicuously absent, so that it cannot properly fall within either definition
of intervention.21 It is in respect to diplomatic asylum that the authors' whole
conception of intervention as "any action of a State designed to influence the
will of another" breaks down altogether and loses all its force; for though the
Latin American governments and writers were greatly instrumental in estab-
lishing the principle of non-intervention, they have been similarly instrumental
in establishing diplomatic asylum as a doctrine sui generis. This further
illustrates the proposition that intervention is a technical term and that the
absence of dictatorial interference removes an action from the category of
intervention. Moreover, the authors' statement, in dealing with the celebrated
Haya de la Torre Cases, that "as for diplomatic asylum, the Court concluded
that it was an illegal intervention,"22 although not inaccurate per se, fails to
bring out the true position. Actually, the International Court of Justice was
limiting its ruling to the unilateral qualification of the offense by the State
granting asylum, which would be an act of intervention unless its legal basis
were clearly established in each specific case.
23
The foregoing observations are not intended to detract in any way from the
merits of the work. There can be no doubt that Professor and Mrs. Thomas
have dealt exhaustively with the law of intervention and non-intervention. One
should look upon the book as a valuable contribution to the solution of a prob-
lem that has greatly disturbed the development of international law.
MANUEL R. GARCIA-MORAt
STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY, ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION IN THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF MULTILATERAL TRADE. By Richard N. Gardner. Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1956. Pp. xxiv, 424. $6.75.
IT is a rare joy to come across a book as appealing to the layman as it is to
the specialist. This is such a book. Historians, economists, political scientists
and lawyers will learn more from it than from many an esoteric volume on the
same subject. And the layman will begin to understand the intricacies of inter-
national economic negotiations and the monotonous succession of high hopes
and bitter disillusionment which have marked the bewildering proliferation of
international economic agreements and institutions in the postwar era.
The curtain rises with the blazing trumpets of the Atlantic Charter in
August 1941 and falls on the quiet burial of the proposed Charter for an In-
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ternational Trade Organization in the fall of 1950. The story centers on three
major episodes of Anglo-American negotiation: the creation of the twin Bret-
ton Woods institutions-the International Monetary Fund and the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Anglo-American Finan-
cial Agreement, and the Charter for an International Trade Organization. The
main, and rare, originality of the book is well described in the preface:
"[This] is not a book of economic theory.... Still less is it a statistical
analysis.... It is rather a book about the making of international eco-
nomic policy and the shaping of institutions to implement that policy. It
places special emphasis on the interaction between official policy and public
opinion.... Thus it is a hybrid work on the borderline of history, inter-
national relations, political science, and even international law. Perhaps
it can best be described as 'a study in international economic diplomacy.""
A single, and highly illuminating, technique is used in all three cases-Bret-
ton Woods, the Anglo-American loan and the ITO-to depict and explain the
rise and fall of Anglo-American collaboration. A high-level conference be-
tween Roosevelt and Churchill concludes with a joint declaration expressing
in broad and high-sounding terms the agreement of both countries with some
idealistic formulation of postwar aims. The second act of the play shifts from
the statesmen to the technicians, who attempt to couch their statemen's
declaration in more concrete terms that may serve as a basis for actual nego-
tiation of a draft agreement. In the third act the negotiators are called in, and
conflicting viewpoints and interests are reconciled into some hybrid compro-
mise, preserved by escape clauses or "transitional" arrangements, or hidden
behind platitudinous statements of intention susceptible of divergent inter-
pretations on both sides of the Atlantic. The fourth act follows the wearisome
process of parliamentary or congressional ratification in each of the two coun-
tries. The experts are disappointed at the compromises, the interests threatened
by the escape clauses rise against ratification, and public opinion must be wooed
by extreme and conflicting commentaries by government administrators about
the agreement's significance and expected consequences. Ratification is finally
won, but the initial enthusiasm has been dissipated and replaced by mutual
weariness and suspicion. And in the fifth act both governments find them-
selves plagued by their previous pronouncements and trapped into rigid for-
mulas unfit to solve the problems of a fast-changing world. Doom comes:
spectacularly for the Anglo-American Agreement with the dazzling collapse
of sterling convertibility in August 1947; obscurely for the International Mone-
tary Fund scuttled into oblivion by its persistent impotence; ingloriously for
the ITO Charter quietly withdrawn by the Administration from a hopeless
congressional debate.
Mr. Gardner brilliantly summarizes the lesson of this triple failure under
three headings: economism, universalism and legalism. Excessive stress on
economic tools and objectives led to the initial neglect of noneconomic factors
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vital to the ultimate success or failure of international cooperation. Concentra-
tion on universal rules and institutions failed to exploit the greater potentiali-
ties, and indispensable role, of closer collaboration among like-minded coun-
tries, particularly between Britain and the United States as the two key coun-
tries, in the world economy. Finally, our hankering for the false security of
precise legal agreements and commitments resulted in unwanted rigidity and
detracted from day-to-day efforts to reach a genuine agreement on devising
and implementing the flexible policies needed to meet ever-changing problems
in a highly fluid economic and political environment.
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The book is sprinkled with numerous illuminating observations well worth
pondering by future planners and negotiators. I cannot resist quoting one of
these, whose wisdom is too rarely appreciated by blueprinters in government
as well as in academic life.
"National policy is rarely influenced as much by impressive blueprints
for future action as by daily expedients contrived to cope with current
problems.... Looking back from our present vantage point we can see
that the measures adopted to bridge the transition from war to peace did
more to influence the quest for multilateralism than all the planning in
advance of permanent institutions for post-war collaboration." 3
Observations such as these are given their full meaning by the way the story
is told. They do not emerge from abstract reasoning but flow naturally from
the narrative itself. The style succeeds in recapturing the high drama of the
events described. The clash of leading personalities-such as Lord Keynes
and Harry Dexter White-is vividly illustrated by aptly chosen anecdotes.
Excerpts from congressional hearings or newspaper editorials plunge the reader
back into the atmosphere of the times, essential for a sympathetic understand-
ing of illusions and errors of judgment easy to criticize from hindsight, but
which will be as difficult to avoid tomorrow as they were yesterday.
ROBERT TRIFFINt
2. The reviewer expresses the heartiest agreement with these conclusions, which go a
long way to explain the far greater success of the "new approach" embodied in the Euro-
pean Recovery Program, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, etc. Mr.
Gardner alludes only briefly to this shift of emphasis (see pp. 299-305), which provides
one of the main themes of a volume on Europe and the Money Muddle to be published
in May of this year by the Yale University Press.
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